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Insurance
by Maximilian A. Pock*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current survey year has again yielded a rich harvest of insurance
cases.' Georgia appellate courts have handed down more than ninety
decisions.2 Several are cases of first impression in Georgia, while many
others have applied or adapted traditional doctrine to a novel factual
matrix. These cases merit exegesis and discussion in varying degrees of
specificity. Although arising in an insurance integument, the remaining
cases concern general substantive law,3 narrow administrative or
technical questions, 4 or pervasive evidentiary and procedural issues.'
They are better discussed under another title or heading.
Perhaps one impressionistic and general observation is in order. The
new wave, "easy reading" policies now percolating through our court
system in increasing numbers have, on the whole, kept their promise.
They are indeed more user friendly. Their only disadvantage seems to

* Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George Washington University.
University of Iowa (J.D., 1958); University of Michigan (S.J.D., 1962). Associate Professor
of Law, Emory University (1961-65). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This Survey includes cases officially reported and made available in print between
June 1, 1993 and May 31, 1994.
2. The number of appellate insurance cases increased from an annual average of 60 in
the 1960s and 1970s to an average of 90 in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, there
were significant flunctuations from year to year with numbers reaching as many as 125.
3. E.g., Vickers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 78, 435 S.E.2d 253 (1993)
(contractual releases, which are not otherwise tainted, are not vulnerable to the vitiating
power of mistakes regarding the severity of the injuries suffered by insureds).
4. E.g., Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Southeast Ati. Cargo Operations, Inc., 211
Ga. App. 660, 440 S.E.2d 254 (1994) (claims against insolvency pools by persons with a net
worth greater than $3 million are precluded).
5. E.g., Cheeley-Towns v. Rapid Group, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 183, 441 S.E.2d 452 (1994)
(motion for reconsideration does not extend time for filing notice of appeal); Simplex-Rapid
di Boschiero v. Italia Asicurazioni, 209 Ga. App. 121, 433 S.E.2d 309 (1993) (lack of in
personam jurisdiction over foreign insurer).
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be that they have, by the stroke of the pen, rendered obsolete the
interpretive judicial gloss generated by the gnarled prose found in
policies of yore.'
The narrow editorial confines of this Survey have imposed selections,
which may appear less inclusive than the subject matter warrants. This
is not a random decision, but rather an enforced choice.
To promote continuity, the materials selected will, as far as possible,
be discussed under the chapter headings employed in previous years.
II.

AGENTS, BROKERS, AND OTHER INTERMEDIARIES

Brokers, who have only a "hunting license" to obtain insurance, are
employed by applicants and owe them a confidential or fiduciary duty.
Independent agents, who represent two or more insurers, are also
employed by applicants and owe them a confidential or fiduciary duty
during at least the advisory or negotiation stage until they effect
coverage with a specific insurer.! Ordinary agents, who represent a
single insurer from the outset, owe no such duty. They sell a product
and are, in most respects, no different from sales representatives who
work for a new car dealership.' This means applicants must deal with
them at arms' length and exercise prudence on their own behalf. It also
means the duty to read is a core modality of the relationship.
This is brought into stark relief by the textbook case of Hyde v.
Acceleration Life Insurance Co. Plaintiff sued a group health insurer
for imputed fraud, alleging he lost his coverage when the insurer's agent
"duped him into prematurely cancelling an existing ...

policy by

promising [him] that he would be covered under a replacement
policy."'
Plaintiff alleged the agent tried to convince him and his

6. One no longer encounters such linguistic monstrosities as "exclusions from
exclusions which are in turn part of some primary exclusion." For an example of easy
reading policy language, see Martin v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 210 Ga. App. 32,32,435

S.E.2d 258, 259 (1993).
7. To some extent this is true even where the independent agent is stipulated to be
a dual agent whose principals do not owe each other any liability in tort. See Home
Materials, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 599,300 S.E.2d 139 (1983). Where agents
lack actual or apparent authority, or "agency power," they may be bound by their own
actions but cannot bind the insurer. See Kilgore v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 210 Ga. App.

434, 436 S.E.2d 547 (1993).
8. Attempts to impose fiduciary duties on agents and insurers have remained sporadic
and appear somewhat aberrational. See Davis v. State Farm Ins. Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. 595
(1989); Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969).
See generally William T. Barker et al., Is an Insurera Fiduciaryto its Insureds, 25 TORT
& INSURANCE LAW JouRNAL 1 (1989).
9. 211 Ga. App. 153, 438 S.E.2d 385 (1993).

10. Id. at 153, 438 S.E.2d at 386.
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fellow employees to switch to another insurer by assuring them the new
policy would be effective immediately, and they would all be covered for
pre-existing conditions because they already represented an actuarily
insurable group." After the agent made her presentation, she gave
each member of the group an application. The application stated there
would be no coverage until its acceptance, and applicants answering any
of the seven designated health questions in the affirmative would not be
approved.12 The application also contained the customary anti-waiver
or modification clause."3 Plaintiff admitted he signed the application
and "entered a 'yes' response to the first health question, affirming that
he had undergone open heart surgery."4 His signature appeared
directly above the agent's signed certification that she had properly
recorded the applicant's responses and advised him not to terminate
existing insurance pending notification of acceptance by the new
insurer.1 5
The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a summary judgment for the
insurer.1 6 Even if the agent had been guilty of a gross misrepresentation,17 the plaintiff had, "'in the exercise of common prudence and
diligence,'"'8 absolutely no right to rely upon it."
In the reverse, although cognate, case of Burkholder v. Ford Life
Insurance Co.,2 the court of appeals held an insurer was not estopped
from relying upon an applicant's misrepresentations in regard to his
health as a defense, unless the agent taking the application had actual
and specific knowledge of the applicant's condition.2 1 It was not enough
that the agent's knowledge was constructive in the sense "that the agent
should have known of a medical problem from the applicant's physical
appearance or should have inquired further."'m

11. Id. at 154, 438 S.E.2d at 386.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 155, 438 S.E.2d at 387.
17. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the record is viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
18. 211 Ga. App. at 155, 438 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting Godwin v. City of Bainbridge, 172
Ga. App. 290, 292, 322 S.E.2d 733, 735 (1984)).
19. Id& Parties cannot rescind releases unless they can show the agent has somehow
prevented them from reading the contents by fraud or artifice. Fincher v. Dempsey, 209
Ga. App. 222, 433 S.E.2d 78 (1993).
20. 207 Ga. App. 908, 429 S.E.2d 344 (1993).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 909, 429 S.E.2d at 346.
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ASSIGNMENT OF POTENTIAL INSURANCE PROCEEDS

Does an owner of a medical benefits policy who has partially assigned
the proceeds to a health care provider, after sustaining an insured loss,
continue to have the right to recover such proceeds from the insurer in
his own name? In North American Life & Casualty Co. v. Riedl,' the
court of appeals held he did not. ' Although the assignor's ownership
status in the policy remains unaffected by such a partial assignment of
a chose in action deriving from it, he no longer has standing to sue solely
in his own name or solely as assignor for the use or benefit of the
assignee.' The real party in interest,26 who "by the substantive law,
has the right sought to be enforced,'"" must now prosecute or join the
action.2
After becoming aware of the assignment, the debtor-insurer acts at its
peril when it pays the assignor. At that point, the debtor-insurer may
object, but the action cannot be dismissed "on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." 9 The trial court
is enjoined to allow a reasonable time after such objection "for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the
real party in interest"' before granting a dismissal.3 1
IV.

CANCELLATION, NONRENEWAL, AND LAPSE OF INSURANCE

Georgia's procedures for cancellation and nonrenewal of insurance
policies operate with the precision of a guillotine because they exact
strict compliance. The procedures are lengthy, replete with incorporations by reference, and relatively complicated. It is not surprising
insurers occasionally blunder in their endeavors to terminate their
contracts. In Bank of Toccoa v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co.,32
the insurer made three mistakes in seeking to "divorce" its insured.

23. 209 Ga. App. 883, 434 S.E.2d 820 (1993).
24. Id. at 885, 434 S.E.2d at 822.
25. Id. at 884, 434 S.E.2d at 822. Vulcan Life Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 191 Ga. App. 79,
380 S.E.2d 751 (1989), is no longer apposite because it is based on former law. 209 Ga.
App. at 884, 434 S.E.2d at 822.
26. 209 Ga. App. at 883, 434 S.E.2d at 821 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a) (1993)).
27. Id. (quoting 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.07 (2d. ed. 1993)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 884, 434 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting O.C.GA. § 9-11-17(a) (1993)) (emphasis
added).
30. Id. (emphasis added). Accord Bundrage v. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 211 Ga.
App. 288, 439 S.E.2d 92 (1993).
31. 209 Ga. App. at 884, 434 S.E.2d at 822.
32. 211 Ga. App. 389, 439 S.E.2d 60 (1993).
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First, the insurer sent a cancellation notice providing only fourteen days
notice instead of the statutory "30 days from the date of mailing or
delivery"'3 3 Second, it gave as reason for cancellation that "THIS34
RISK DOES NOT MEET OUR ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.'
The insurer tried to cure this in the course of litigation by asserting the
reason was shorthand "'for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity' 35
based on a newspaper report indicating the insured had been arrested
on a counterfeiting charge.3" Third, the insurer assumed the original
policy was properly cancelled; therefore, it failed to send a timely
nonrenewal notice.37 The court of appeals held the fourteen day
cancellation notice was fatally defective and rejected the insurer's plea
that "the policy should be 'deemed' to be cancelled 30 days after the
notice date in such cases." 8 The court of appeals also found the stated
basis for cancellation was dehors any of the eight authorized reasons for
cancellation specifically listed in the statute.3 9 Conceding, arguendo,
that the real basis for cancellation was reasonable suspicion, such
cancellation would still be invalid because the statute authorizes
cancellation only where there is "'a conviction record, criminal or
traffic."' 4 Since the insurer's assumption that it had cancelled the
policy faltered on the facts, the insurer should have sent a nonrenewal
notice. The failure to do so extended the term of the original policy for
another six months.4 '
What is the posture of affairs when the insured fails to meet the
obligations regarding premium payments or pays by a check which
"bounces"?

33. Id. at 390, 439 S.E.2d at 62 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(b) (1990)).
34. Id. (quoting the policy).
35. Id. at 391, 439 S.E.2d at 63.
36. Id. at 390, 439 S.E.2d at 61.
37. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 62.
38. Id. See Clark v. Superior Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 290, 433 S.E.2d 394 (1993)
(requiring premium finance companies to strictly comply with statutory notice requirements).
39. 211 Ga. App. at 391, 439 S.E.2d at 62 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(c) (1990 & Supp.
1994)).
40. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(c)(7)(C) (1990 & Supp. 1994)).
41. Id. at 393, 439 S.E.2d at 64 (citing O.C.G-A. § 33-24-45(e)(1) (1990 & Supp. 1994)).
The court also held that an insured's waiver of notice requirements cannot affect loss
payees under the bullet-proof New York Standard or Union Mortgage Clause found in fire
policies. Id. at 392,439 S.E.2d at 63. See Clark v. Superior Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 290,433
S.E.2d 394, 396 (1993) (only lienholders have standing to complain about defective notice
given to lienholders by premium finance companies).
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In Boarders v. GlobalInsurance Co.,2 the court of appeals reaffirmed
that the answer depends upon whether the policy at issue is a new or
A new policy requires a ten-day cancellation norenewal policy.'
tice." A renewal policy, however, requires no cancellation notice and
may be voided at its inception.45 The character of the policy is a matter
of construction that is normally a legal question for the judge to
deside. 4 Furthermore, in order to qualify as a renewal policy, the
policy must be issued by the same insurer and "'providle] no less than
the coverage contained in the superseded policy."' 4 7 In Boarders, the
facts showed the insured signed a "Renewal Statement" which contained
in bold-type a clear provision that "'COVERAGE WILL BE NULL AND
VOID'" if a premium check is returned because of insufficient funds.'
Since the policy did not etiolate the coverage provided by the original
policy, the trial court, in granting a summary judgment for the insurer,
was justified in concluding that it was intended to serve as a renewal
policy requiring no specific cancellation notice.49
Another nonpayment case eluded summary disposition because of its
peculiar facts. In Morgan u. Georgia General Insurance Co.," the
insureds bought a new automobile policy and paid premiums in
51
installments under an arrangement with a premium finance company.
They received a renewal offer from the insurer which "stated a total
amount for the premium and provided a space for a check mark
indicating the insured's desire to finance the premium through" the
same premium finance company.5 2 The court of appeals held the
insured's mailing of the signed and properly marked renewal offer
created a bilateral contract committing the insurer to instant coverage
in consideration of the promise to pay the premium in installments."

42. 208 Ga. App. 480, 430 S.E.2d 854 (1993).
43. I& at 481, 430 S.E.2d at 855.
44. O.C.GA. § 33-2444(d) (1990).
45. Id. § 33-24-45(f) (2-3) (1990 & Supp. 1994).
46. 208 Ga. App. at 481, 430 S.E.2d at 856.
47. Id. at 482, 430 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(b)(2) (1990 & Supp.
1994)).
48. Id. at 483, 430 S.E.2d at 857 (quoting the policy).
49. Id. The court noted that a change of policy numbers for administrative reasons, a
change in insured vehicles, and a change in endorsements that do not otherwise debase
coverage are not conclusive indicia or indices of the policy's proper classification. Id They

are merely relevant to the determination whether a renewal policy was in fact intended.
Id.
50.

210 Ga. App. 614, 436 S.E.2d 782 (1993).

51.

Id. at 614, 436 S.E.2d at 783.

52.

Id. at 615, 436 S.E.2d at 783.

53.

I.
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The question regarding the acceptance of the offer created a fact issue
for the jury, which precluded summary judgment for the insurer."
Proper timing is also an issue pervading cancellation cases. The
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") provides that cancellations for failure to pay premiums when due may be accomplished "by
delivering or mailing written notice to the named insured... at least
In Timely
ten days prior to the effective date of cancellation."'
EntertainmentInternational,Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,'
the court of appeals held that a notice dispatched on the very date the
premium became due satisfied the mandate."7 A notice sent prior to
the maturity date would be premature and thus, qualifies solely as a
demand for payment, rather than an effective cancellation notice as
required by the O.C.G.A."
Finally, in Walton v. PrudentialInsurance Co., 59 the court of appeals
held that reinstatement of a life insurance policy must strictly conform
to the terms of the policy." The insured and cestui had his life policy
cancelled for failure to pay premiums.6 ' Seven months later, after a
diagnosis of lung cancer, he submitted an incomplete application for
reinstatement along with the reinstatement fee and a portion of the first
month's premium. The insured died about two months later. Subsequently, the insurer, unaware of his death, returned the application for
completion of the health questions.62 The application was "honestly'
filled out, but his death was not noted." Did the insurer's retention of
the partial premium, together with the fact that it took the insurer
nearly four months to resubmit the application for completion, constitute
acceptance of the insured's application (offer) by conduct, thus precluding
the insurer from denying that the insurance was in force at the date of
his death? The court of appeals held it did not.65 The original policy
provided for reinstatement "'within 3 years after termination thereof"
54. Id.
55.
56.

O.C.GJ.A § 33-24-44(d) (1990).
208 Ga. App. 467, 430 S.E.2d 844 (1993).

57. Id. at 469, 430 S.E.2d 846.
58. Id. See also Stapleton v. Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal., 209 Ga. App. 674, 434 S.E.2d 116
(1993) (absent signature of postal clerk is not fatal to proper notice where receipt is
indicated by official U.S. Postal Service stamp).
59. 210 Ga. App. 82, 435 S.E.2d 289 (1993).
60. Id. at 83, 435 S.E.2d at 291.
61. Id. at 82, 435 S.E.2d at 290.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 83, 435 S.E.2d at 291.
66. Id. (quoting the policy).
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on the condition the insured furnished evidence of good health and paid
the entire premium. 67 Neither of these conditions were met." Furthermore, mere receipt of the application and retention of the accompanying premium does not turn silence into assent in Georgia."9
V. CONDITIONAL BINDING RECEIPT

Georgia has not succumbed to the blandishments of the pro-consumerite view of conditional binding receipts issued in connection with life and
health insurance which holds, almost by rubric, that the insurer is
bound to a temporary contract of insurance which is binding as soon as
the application is completed and the first premium payment is made.7 °
In World Insurance Co. v. Blalock,71 the applicant for a health
insurance policy received a conditional receipt from the authorized
soliciting agent stating there would be no coverage until the insurer was
"satisfied that, at the time of completing.., the application ... , [the
applicant was] insurable under [the insurer's] rules... 'for underwriting
the risk.'"'72 This precluded instant insurance and required a determination
regarding insurability as a condition precedent to any cover73
age

VI.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Until recently, Georgia was a traditional vested rights state in the
conflict of laws.7 4 The referent and dispositive law on substantive
issues was the place of the transaction.7 5 In insurance contracts, this

67. Id. at 82-83, 435 S.E.2d at 290.
68. Id. at 82, 435 S.E.2d at 290.
69. Id. at 83, 435 S.E.2d at 290. See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation,
Liability of Insurerfor Damages Resulting from Delay in Passing Upon an Applicationfor
Life Insurance, 1 A.L.R. 4th 1202 (1980); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Liability ofInsurer
for Damages Resulting from Delay in Passing Upon Applicationfor Health Insurance, 18
A.L.R. 4th 1115 (1982); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALLAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.4(b)(3)
(1988); EDWIN W. PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 76-78 (2d ed. 1957).
70. A paradigmatic case on this point is Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa.
579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978) (the constructive ambiguity between the label "binding receipt",
which connotes instant coverage, and the text of the receipt is resolved in favor of the
applicant even if the text is nonambiguous). There are basically three kinds of binding
receipts. The approval type, the satisfaction type, and the unconditional temporary
insurance type, which is largely the product of judicial fiat. See ROBERT M. JERRY,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 33(c), (d) (1991).
71. 207 Ga. App. 813, 429 S.E.2d 276 (1993).
72. Id.- at 813, 429 S.E.2d at 277 (quoting the policy).
73. Id.
74. Federal Ins. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., 203 Ga. App. 763, 417 S.E.2d 671 (1992).
75. Id. at 763, 417 S.E.2d at 673.
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was the place where the last act requisite to the formation of the
contract occurred (lex contractus). 76 It was not the place where the
insurer dispatched the acceptance of the insured's offer (the application),
but where the policy was delivered. 7 The place of performance (lex
solutionis), while resorted to in non-insurance contracts, was of little
avail in insurance contracts because the locus of the contemplated
Georgia eschewed such
performance normally eluded identification.'
new dispensations as state interest analysis and the most significant
relationship approach pioneered by the Restatement.7 9 Where the
rhetoric of the new dispensations surfaced in Georgia opinions, usually
it was in a factual integument where traditional and "new wave"
analyses demanded identical results.'
No case appears to have explicitly relied upon the new dispensations.
This was changed by Amica Mutual Insurance v. Bourgault.s ' In
Bourgualtthe Georgia Supreme Court ("supreme court") relied explicitly
upon the Restatement and out-of-state interpretive authority for the
decision.'
Georgia residents procured an automobile liability policy on their three
cars, which were registered and principally garaged in New York.
Although prepared in New York and based on New York rates, the policy
was applied for and actually delivered in Georgia.8 Since New York
and Georgia laws were antithetical, the choice of law problem was

76. Id.
77.

Id. at 767,417 S.E.2d at 674-75. See also Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc. 191

Ga. 502, 13 S.E.2d 337, affd, 314 U.S. 201 (1941) (auto policy: contract is made where
policy is delivered); Iowa State Travelers Mut. Ass'n v. Caldwell, 113 Ga. App. 128, 147
S.E.2d 461 (1966) (life policy: contract is constructively made where policy is delivered).
78. Absent a valid choice of law clause or an indication of the place of performance, the
dispositive law is that of the place where the policy was delivered, unless application of
such law would be violative of Georgia public policy and application of Georgia law would
not violate due process. Clabo v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 110, 113,
413 S.E.2d 476, 477-78 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Spivey v. Safeway Ins. Co.,
210 Ga. App. 775, 778,437 S.E.2d 641,645(1993). Occasionally the place of performance
can be ascertained. For example, where the insured activity is centered upon a particular
state, the place of performance is that state. Batson-Cook Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 200 Ga.
App. 571, 572, 409 S.E.2d 41, 42 (1991) (the fact that the policy was issued and to be
performed in the same state mooted, as it often does, the question whether the court
should apply the lex contractusin its narrow formation-sense, or the lex solutionis).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 (1967).
80. Federal Ins. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., 203 Ga. App. at 765,417 S.E.2d at 673-74.
See also General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 168 Ga. App. 344,350,309 S.E.2d

152, 158 (1983) (brief reference to modem conflicts theories).
81. 263 Ga. 157, 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993).
82. Id. at 160, 429 S.E.2d at 911.
83. Id. at 158, 429 S.E.2d at 910.
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thrown into sharp relief.8" The supreme court held New York law
governed "the validity of and rights created by" the liability policy
because it was "the law of the state which the parties understood to be
the principal location of the insured risk."es
Although Bourgault constituted a departure from formalistic slot
machine conflicts rules, its sweep should not be exaggerated. The
decision, while not referring to them explicitly, is compatible with at
least two traditional solutions. First, it may represent an application of
the lex solutionis because, "'in the case of an automobile liability policy,
the parties.. . usually know beforehand where the automobile will be
garaged."
The place of performance, while usually elusive, can be
readily identified. Second, it may simply represent a recognition of party
autonomy exercised by conduct and implication rather than by the
adoption of an express choice of law clause in the policy itself."' The
decision may only foreshadow a cautious and selective adoption of those
Restatement principles which are rooted in tradition, allowing an orderly
evolution of Georgia law, rather than portend a wholesale and indiscriminate displacement of Georgia conflicts rules as they pertain to insurance
law.88
VII.

CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

A.

Engaged in Any Way in a Car Business
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Automobile Co. v. Seeba,c a
wrongful death action was brought against the driver of a truck and
trailer after a multi-vehicle collision. While admitting the the driver
was an insured permittee, the owner's insurer contended the coverage
was excluded because the accident occurred while the truck and trailer
were "being repaired, serviced or used by any person employed or

84. Id. at 160, 429 S.E.2d at 911.
85. Id. at 160, 429 S.E.2d at 911 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 193 (1967)).
86.

Id. (quotingRESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193. cmt. bat 244 (1967)).

87. Id. "Itwas ... more reasonable for the parties to expect that New York law rather
than Georgia law would be determinative.' Id.
88. Even jurisdictions which at times have followed the Restatement approach have on
occasions discretely rejected the significance of particular connecting factors or contacts
that are listed in the Restatement. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 579, 249
N.E.2d 394, 400 (1969) (rejecting as irrelevant the place where a guest-host relationship
arose or was centered as proposed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 145(2)(d)).
89. 209 Ga. App. 328, 433S.E.2d 414 (1993).
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engaged in any way in a car business.' The evidence established that
the owner left the vehicles with a tractor and farm equipment sales and
service company ("car business"), which was to sell them on commission.
The company hired the driver in question to move the vehicles to a more
suitable display location and to assist in selling the vehicles in return for
part of the commission. The accident occurred while the vehicles were
moving to the new location.91 It was also shown that the driver
occasionally helped in the company's car business by engaging "in
similar transactions on the average of one a year for the last ten
years.' 2 The driver, however, was principally the owner and manager
of a business "engaged in training, showing, and selling horses.' e
Was the driver, as the focus of the exclusion, engaged in any way in
a car business at the time of the collision? The court of appeals held he
was not.' The language of the exclusion was ambiguous when viewed
against the purpose it subserved.9' "[Elngaged in any way" arguably
encompasses any activity, no matter how fleeting, if it related to "a
'business or job where the purpose is to sell, lease, repair, service,
The term business, by
transport, store or park' motor vehicles."'
contrast, denotes a measure of constancy, "'an undertaking engaged in
with some regularity and for profit and income.'" 97
Contra proferentem, coupled with the rule that language placed in
exclusions must be narrowly construed against the insurer, required a
finding that the driver was only engaged in a secondary activity or
hobby,98 which did not amount to a car business."s
B.

Expected or Intended
The 1966 revision of the comprehensive liability policy excludes
coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which is either expected

90. Id. at 329, 433 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 328, 433 S.E.2d at 415.
92. Id. at 329, 433 S.E.2d at 416.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 329, 433 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
97. Id. (quoting State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Thigpen, 131 Ga. App. 608, 610-11,
206 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1974)).
98. Id. at 330, 433 S.E.2d at 417.
99. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 416-17. Even if one concedes the driver was a partner or joint
adventurer with the tractor company, his activities would not implicate him in the car
business because of their transitory nature. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 417.
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or intended from the standpoint of the insured."' 0 This simple phrase
has proved litigation prone and has led to a good deal of logomachy over
such concepts as "wilfulness," "wantonness," and "conscious indifference
to consequences." It has also engendered some dispute over the
applicability of the tort rule (an actor is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of an intended act) or the more narrow contract rule (the
exclusion focuses upon the intent to cause harm rather than the intent
to perform the germinal act eventuating in harm). The discursive
opinion in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Walker County'"' serves to clarify
Georgia's stance in this regard.
In Reliance the court of appeals explained the exclusion applies
whenever the actor engages in conduct which is intended to cause the
very harm which eventuated, or is intended to cause some harm even
though the actual harm differs from the one intended, or is accompanied
by a state of mind so reckless or consciously indifferent to consequences
as to impel the conclusion that the harm must have been "expected or
intended."102 These three scenarios clearly present jury questions
based on meticulously worded instructions and generally elude
disposition by summary judgment.0 3 The burden of proof is on the
insurer. 4 The test is subjective, as it focuses on the actor's state of
mind." 5 Conduct which is grossly negligent, or the product of bad
judgment, does not meet the test.1e 6
Generalizations'of this kind may falter upon the language of the
particular policy at issue. In Stinson v. Allstate Insurance Co.,107 the

exclusion in a homeowner's policy stated unambiguously that "[wie do
not cover any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably
be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured

100. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, 654 app. G (1971). See generally Rynearson,
Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property Damage Under the

Occurrence Definitionof the StandardComprehensive GeneralLiability Policy, 19 FORUM
513 (1984).

101. 208 Ga. App. 729, 431 S.E.2d 700 (1993).
102. 208 Ga. App. at 731, 431 S.E.2d at 702.
103. Id. at 730, 431 S.E.2d at 702.
104. Id. at 731, 431 S.E.2d at 702.
105. Id. at 732, 431 S.E.2d at 703.
106. Id. It is difficult to tell whether Georgia treats expected and intended,terms which
are posed in the disjunctive, as synonymous. There is some dispute on this issue in other
states. Compare State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364
(1973) (terms are synonymous) with Northwestern Nat. Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 182 Mont.
448, 597 P.2d 720 (1979) (terms do not have the same meaning because they would be
redundant).
107. 212 Ga. App. 179, 441 S.E.2d 453 (1994).
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person."'
Since there was no reference to the standpoint of the
insured, the court of appeals rejected the subjective test and held that
"[tihe more universal objective test ... pertains to this branch of the
exclusion."0 9 The factfinders were required to determine whether a
person in the position of the insured could reasonably expect his act of
firing a high-powered hunting rifle through the front door of a house
would cause injury, and not whether the insured, as the actor in this
melodrama, actually harbored such expectations.'"
C.

Use... of an Aircraft

Ivey v. First of Georgia Insurance Co.,"' a case of first impression,
involved a homeowner who sold a Midget Mustang I airplane and agreed
to teach the buyer how to fly it. Because of the single seat design of the
plane, the homeowner "remained on the ground and used a handheld
radio to communicate with [the buyer] during flight."" 2 An accident
occurred when the buyer landed the plane, and the homeowner faced a
liability suit. Was the homeowner covered under his liability floater
which excluded claims "'arising out of the ...

use ...

of an air-

craft'?"" 3 The court of appeals held he was not." 4 Relying upon
analogues drawn from automobile and watercraft accident cases, the
court of appeals concluded that the term "use" extended "beyond actual
physical contact ... at least to the point, beyond physical contact, where
control over the instrumentality is easily or reasonably at hand, and
particularly when it is still being "utilized","'1 and was "not ambiguous in the context of this case.""' It thus precluded recourse to contra
proferentem.
The accident arose out of the use of an aircraft because it was
"impossible to imagine a circumstance in which a flight instructor could
provide ground-to-air instruction without the involvement of an
airplane."" 7 In his trenchant dissent, Judge Blackburn raised some

108. Id. at 180, 441 S.E.2d at 454 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
109. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 195 Ga. App. 335,338,393 S.E.2d 489,492
(1990)) (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 181, 441 S.E.2d at 454.
111. 209 Ga. App. 784, 434 S.E.2d 556 (1993).
112. Id. at 785, 434 S.E.2d at 557.
113. Id. (quoting the policy).
114. Id. at 786, 434 S.E.2d at 558.
115. 1d. (quoting Hartford Accident Ins. Co. v. Baker, 140 Ga. App. 3, 4-5, 230 S.E.2d
70, 72 (1976)).
116. Id.
117. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 557.
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puzzling questions about the case."1
He argued the exclusion was
ambiguous because, unlike most other exclusions in the homeowner's
policy at issue, it did not specifically refer to the insured." 9 It could
arguably apply "to any person's use of an aircraft" or "only to the
insured's use of an aircraft.2 ° Even if one concedes that this presents
an ambiguity, it is difficult to see how the resolution of the ambiguity
would have helped the insured. Contra proferentem would have
restricted the scope of the exclusion to "the insured's use," which is
precisely the activity which eliminated the insured from coverage.' 2 '
D. While... Getting Into
In Major v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 2 the claimant "was standing
behind her son's car when another car hit her."' Was she entitled to
uninsured motorist benefits under her son's policy which covered "[any
person while ...

getting into your ...

auto with your permission?"124

The court of appeals held she was not."2 Curiously, the case was one
of first impression because the uninsured motorist coverage at issue was
more liberal than that mandated by the Georgia Insurance Code. 28
After an encyclopedic inquiry into the etymological range of the phrase
getting into and its congruent definitions, the court of appeals concluded
that it meant an act of entry requiring either "direct physical contact
between the claimant and the insured vehicle" or "the claimant actually
having placed a portion of... her body in the vehicle." 7 Physical
proximity, the "act of approaching the vehicle," or "preparing to enter the
vehicle," are not sufficient.'2

118. 209 Ga. App. at 786, 434 S.E.2d at 558 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 787, 434 S.E.2d at 558.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 788, 434 S.E.2d at 559. Judge Blackburn also faulted the majority for
applying a liberal interpretation of use extracted from cases construing coverage provisions
thus departing from the rule that coverages are to be broadly construed and exclusions and
exceptions from coverage are to be narrowly construed. 209 Ga. App. at 788, 434 S.E.2d
at 559 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
122. 207 Ga. App. 805, 429 S.E.2d 172 (1993).
123. Id. at 805, 429 S.E.2d at 172.
124. Id. (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 807, 429 S.E.2d at 174.
126. O.C.GA. § 33-7-11(b)(1XB) (1992 & Supp. 1994). The statute covers only
permittees and guests in the car. 207 Ga. App. at 805, 429 S.E.2d at 173. Similar
language was found in the now defunct No-Fault Statute.
127. 207 Ga. App. at 806, 429 S.E.2d at 173.
128. Id. (quoting Floyd v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 193 Ga. App. 350, 351, 387
S.E.2d 625, 626 (1989)).
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COOPERATION CLAUSES

Insurance policies bristle with cooperation clauses obligating the
insured to notify the insurer immediately or as soon as possible of an
insured event, to file a timely proof of loss, and to render specified
assistance in the investigation of the occurrence. Strictly speaking, such
clauses are not promissory in the sense that their breach may expose the
insured to a damage suit. They serve as conditions of coverage and are
enforced by forfeiture of coverage. Many of the cooperation clauses come
well armed with buckler and shield because they are even formulated as
express conditions precedent.
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martin," a truck
owned by Day and allegedly driven by Delk hit a bicyclist. A tort action
was filed naming Day and Delk as defendants. Although service upon
Day was technically defective, he immediately informed his liability
carrier of the claim and service. Delk was properly served, but he
ignored the action entirely and allowed it to go into default. Two days
before Delk's fifteen day grace period to open default expired, plaintiff's
counsel sent a copy of the complaint to the carrier by certified mail."m
Subsequently, Day was properly served and again notified his carrier.
Plaintiff's counsel, not having received a receipt for the certified mailing,
personally served the carrier with a copy of the complaint. The carrier
filed an answer on behalf of Day, but not on Delk's behalf. After an
evidentiary hearing, a judgment was entered against Delk. Day was
voluntarily dismissed."3 '
The court of appeals held that the carrier was obligated to pay the
default judgment against Delk. 132 The court explained that Georgia's
statutory mandate for notification" does not require the "actor" or
additional insured (Delk) to personally notify the liability insurer."
The mandate is satisfied if "the insurer receives notice of the suit either
from an insured or from a third party.'"'
Here, the insurer had
notice before the action against the additional insured (Delk) went into
default and before the grace period for opening default expired. Yet, "it
failed to avail itself of several opportunities to participate in the action

129. 209 Ga. App. 237, 433 S.E.2d 315 (1993).
130. Id. at 237-38, 433 S.E.2d at 316.
131. Id. at 238, 423 S.E.2d at 316.
132. Id. at 239,433 S.E.2d at 317.
133. Id. at 238, 433 S.E.2d at 316 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-15 (1992)).
134. Id. at 238, 433 S.E.2d at 316-17.
135. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting Mahone v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 Ga.
App. 664, 667, 373 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1988)).
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against Delk."3 6 For example, the insurer failed to show Delk was not
a permissive user as alleged.317 Furthermore, although Delk's failure
to elect coverage under the Day policy by active solicitation of such
coverage may absolve the liability insurer of any obligation to Delk, it
cannot absolve the liability insurer from its obligation to cover Delk's
liability to the plaintiff.'
Delk, who apparently carried no liability
insurance of his own, could not reject the liability coverage available to
him under the Day policy and thus elect to denude innocent victims of
his negligence of the protection envisaged by Georgia's compulsory
liability scheme. 3 The court of appeals also held Georgia's notification procedures" did not rob the liability insurer of its constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection by penalizing it for "the
inaction of the additional insured."' The insurer's rights were amply
secured because it would have been relieved from paying the default
judgment had it not received timely notice from any source.
Occasionally, cooperation clauses are so clearly breached that one
wonders about the perceived need for litigation. In Aegis Security
Insurance Co. v. Hiers,' the owner of a mobile home policy, containing the usual liability floater, learned that his son, the named insured
under the policy and occupier of the home, had been involved in a
shooting incident. He "learned about the shooting, the day after it happened."' Although the policy required notice "as soon as practicable,"
neither he nor anyone else bothered to tell the insurer about the
event. 145 The insurer "ultimately learned about the shooting approximately 22 months after it occurred," long after the victim's tort suit was
filed. 4 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a
motion for summary judgement in favor of the insurer and held the

136. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 317.
137. Id. at 240, 433 S.E.2d at 317-18.
138. Id. at 239, 433 S.E.2d at 317.
139. Id. (citing Starnes v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App. 320, 322, 390
S.E.2d 419, 421 (1990), aft'd, Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 260 Ga. 235, 392
S.E.2d 3 (1990)). See also Pock, Insurance, 43 MERCER L. REv. 285, 303 (1991).
140. 209 Ga. App. at 238, 433 S.E.2d at 317 (citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-15(c) (1992) and
O.C.GA. § 40-9-103(c)(1991)).
141. 209 Ga. App. at 238, 433 S.E.2d at 317.
142. Id.
143. 211 Ga. App. 639, 440 S.E.2d 71 (1994).
144. Id. at 639, 440 S.E.2d at 72.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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delay was "unreasonable as a matter of law" 147 because neither insured
"offered any excuse for failing to notify"'" the insurer. 49
IX.

DIRECT ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE CARRIERS

Three states and two United States territories have direct action
statutes that allow claimants to join alleged tortfeasors and their
liability carriers in a single action before establishing the tortfeasors'
liability by judgment or settling the case with them." This achieves
certain economies in litigation, but it also alerts verdict-happy and
perhaps biased juries to the presence of a "deep pocket."
Georgia has a limited direct action statute, authorizing certain motor
common carriers and contract carriers to be joined with their insurers. 5 ' In Johnson v. Woodward,"2 the court of appeals defined the
geographical sweep of the statute.'5' A tractor-trailer owned and
operated by a Georgia motor common carrier was involved in a collision
with a car in South Carolina. The common carrier held a certificate of
public convenience and necessity issued by the Georgia Public Service
Commission as an entity operating in both interstate and intrastate
commerce.'M The court of appeals held the direct action statute
expressly authorized "any person" with "a cause of action" arising under
it to sue the common carrier and join its insurer in the same action.' 55
Absent any geographic restrictions in the statute itself, there was no
reason to infer any legislative intent to preclude such joinder because
the claim arose from a tort occurring in a sister state.'5
Joinder is not a perfunctory matter; it is only available upon a
showing that a specific insurer is at least potentially present upon the
risk.'57 Two cases illustrate this. In McMillon v. Empire Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.,5 8 a common carrier hired the driver and owner
of a tractor-trailer "to haul goods under a trip lease agreement." 5 9
The driver was involved in an automobile accident, resulting in a direct

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See JERRY, supra note 71, at § 84(b).
O.C.G.A. §§ 46-7-12(e) to -58(e) (1992).
208 Ga. App. 41, 429 S.E.2d 701 (1993).
Id. at 45-46, 429 S.E.2d at 705.
Id. at 42, 429 S.E.2d at 702.
Id. at 44, 429 S.E.2d at 704 (construing O.C.G.A. §§ 46-7-12(b),(c),(e) (1992)).
208 Ga. App. at 45, 429 S.E.2d at 705.
209 Ga. App. 378, 380, 433 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1993).
209 Ga. App. 378, 433 S.E.2d 429 (1993).
Id. at 378, 433 S.E.2d at 430.
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action by the injured party against the common carrier, and, somewhat
inexplicably, the driver's own insurer as the alleged insurer for the
carrier. The driver was never named as defendant. The insurer showed
the policy was "explicitly denominated as 'Insurance for Non-Trucking
Use ' "16° and contained a business use exclusion negating "coverage
while the tractor-trailer was leased to another business or used to carry
the property of any business.""6 ' The joinder was improper because
the insurer was not potentially present upon the risk.' 62
Wright v. Transus, Inc.,163 by contrast, involved a direct action
against a common carrier and its insurer. The action was based on the
allegation that one of the carrier's employees negligently injured the
plaintiff while driving a tractor-trailer.'
Whether the operator was
an independent contractor or an employee for whose actions the carrier
was vicariously liable became a contentious issue at the very outset. The
issue precluded disposition by summary judgment and continued as an
issue of fact for jury resolution.'
The carrier's potential nonliability
did not invalidate the joinder.'" The court of appeals determined the
sole test was whether the posture of the case implicated the insurer as
a party potentially liable under its policy. 6 7 The test was met when
the plaintiff pressed a cause of action against the common carrier which,
if successful, would be covered by the policy.
X.

EXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS

In Spivey v. Safeway Insurance Co.," a sharply divided court 69
reaffirmed' 70 that the notorious family or household exclusion in
automobile liability policies does not violate Georgia public policy,

160. Id. at 379, 433 S.E.2d at 430.

161. Id.
162. Id. at 380, 433 S.E.2d at 431.
163.
164.
165.

209 Ga. App. 771, 434 S.E.2d 786 (1993).
Id. at 771, 434 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 773, 434 S.E.2d at 789.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 210 Ga. App. 775, 437 S.E.2d 641 (1993).
169. Id. at 775, 437 S.E.2d at 641. (This division was reflected in a five to four
decision.):
170. Id. The court of appeals partially overruled its own decision in Clabo v. Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 110, 413 S.E.2d 476 (1991) and relied on its expanded
reading of the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Southern Guarantee Ins. Co. v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. 355, 359 S.E.2d 665 (1987). 210 Ga. App. at 775,
437 S.E.2d at 644-45.
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despite being invalid in a majority of jurisdictions. 17 ' The case involved a one car accident in which the owner and sole named insured
was injured by the alleged negligence of the driver. The owner had
expressly permitted the driver to drive while she remained in the car as
a passenger. Her insurer contended the owner was not covered under
her own policy, although the driver was admittedly an additional
insured under the same policy as a permittee. 172 The reason was the
liability portion of the policy excluded coverage "[flor bodily injury,
property damage or death sustained by any insured or any member of
the family of an insured residing in the same household as the insured."173
Literal application of this exclusion meant the victim's sole recourse
was a tort suit against her permittee. The permittee would be forced to
pay the resulting judgment out of his own pocket unless he had a
liability policy of his own covering him while driving a non-owned
automobile. There was no evidence that the permittee carried such
insurance. Was this compatible with Georgia's compulsory liability
regime which envisages comprehensivefInancial protection of the public
against the highly predictable 74 societal friction damage wrought by
the ubiquitous automobile? Five of the nine judges on the court of
appeals thought it was. 75 Compulsory insurance statutes do not
automatically invalidate all exclusions. Their validity must be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. 7 The sole named insured in this particular
case could hardly claim the status of an innocent member of the public
who found herself denuded of reasonably expected coverage. She bought
the policy and was presumed to be aware of its terms. 177 Furthermore,
the public policy against unfairly exposing named insureds to unanticipated liability does not extend to the permissive driver, because he is

171. See e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sivey, 404 Mich. 51, 272 N.W.2d 555
(1978) (exclusio unius prevented expansion of exclusions which were limited to two specific
permissible exclusions in the liability insurance statute). See also JERRY, supra note 71,
at § 135C. It should be noted that insurers have fared much better in their attempts to
retain the household exclusion in their uninsured and underinsured coverages.
172. 210 Ga. App. 775, 437 S.E.2d at 643.
173. Id. at 776, 437 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
174. The Highway Safety Institute, in a macabre sort of way, can tell us the number
of highway fatalities that will be sustained on given national holidays with almost
metronomic accuracy.
175. Id. at 778, 437 S.E.2d at 644-45.

176. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 644 (relying upon Southern Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Preferred Risk
Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Ga. 355, 356, 359 S.E.2d 665 (1987)).
177. Id-
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only an additional insured and otherwise a stranger to the policy. 178

It fOllowed that the exclusion was a matter of party autonomy and not
violative of public policy.179
The decision is unfortunate. It is difficult to defend even if one is
sympathetic to the legitimate concern of insurers about the risk of
friendly or familial collusion, a concern which was not mentioned by the
court. ' ° The first prong of the court's rationale represents the duty to
read gone amok. Insurance policies, even in their new simple English
iterations, are complex documents which are often arcane to lawyers. 8 ' Can one rationally expect a car owner, who lets a relative,
friend, or acquaintance drive while remaining in the car as a passenger,
to know that such a commonplace arrangement may, contrary to all
reasonable expectations, potentially denude her of coverage in case of an
accident? The second prong apodictically draws distinction between
named and additional insureds, according liability protection to the
former but not the latter.8 2 This distinction seems spurious when one
considers the financial impact of exposing either class of insureds to
potential liability may be the same."
Moore v. Allstate Insurance Co. 1 ' was decided in a similar vein. The
operator of a city garbage truck was involved in a collision with another
vehicle and was sued by its driver. The suit also named the City of
Atlanta as a defendant. The operator's private automobile insurance
carrier denied coveragebecause the policy excluded "'a non-owned auto
while being used in any business or occupation of a person insured.'"'

178. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 645 (overruling that prong of Clabo v. Tennessee Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 110, 114-15, 413 S.E.2d 476, 478-79 (1991), which held that
permittees cannot be denuded of liability coverage under the named insured's policy unless
they are beneficiaries of alternative insurance protection).
179. 210 Ga. App. at 778, 437 S.E.2d at 645.
180. KEETON, supra note 101, at 662 app. H (1963 Standard Family Combination
Automobile Policy Form); Alliance of American Insurers, 1991 Policy Kit for Students of
Insurance 3 Part A (1991) (1982 Standard Personal Auto Policy) (hereinafter "KIT").
181. As a professor, the author is constantly amazed at the degree of ignorance
displayed by his own insurance law students about the contents of their policies. They
simply know that "they are insured" against a number of vague risks. For a qualified
defense of the duty to read, see Ingram, Should An InsuredBe Rewarded ForNot Reading
The Policy?, 41 DRAKE L. REv. 705-10 (1992).
182. 210 Ga. App. at 778, 437 S.E.2d at 645.
183. It is exactly the same where the permittee carries no policy of his own that is
present upon the risk. See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 70, at § 4.7(b)(3).
184. 211 Ga. App. 827, 440 S.E.2d 682 (1994). Cf Kilgore v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co.,
210 Ga. App. 434, 436 S.E.2d 547 (1993) (exclusion in tractor policy of certain towing
situations was not violative of Georgia's general liability mandate).
185. 211 Ga. App. at 828, 440 S.E.2d at 683 (quoting the policy).
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While conceding that the garbage truck was excluded by this language,
the plaintiff argued the City of Atlanta carried only $1,000 in liability
coverage, which vitiated the exclusion as to him because; it derogated
from the protection secured by the compulsory insurance statute."
The court of appeals made short shrift of this argument by declaring,
without explanatory embroidery, that "[hiere, innocent members of the
public are not injured by application of this exclusion, and there is no
unfair exposure of the insured to liability."" 7
Perhaps the judicial calculus which balances the protection contemplated by the compulsory insurance regime against the needs of party
autonomy achieves its most agreeable results when the facts of the
individual case remove the injured third party's vulnerability to
potential financial disaster. Thus, the named driver exclusion "' and
the intentional bodily injury or property damage exclusion'8 9 were both
upheld because the injured innocent third party had access to alternative
coverage in the form of uninsured motorist insurance furnished under
other policies.'9 0
The remaining decisions do not involve automobile liability policies. 9' In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Shawnee Mechanical
Contractors,Inc.,"9 a general business liability policy purchased by a
liquor package store excluded, in pertinent part, coverage for "furnishing
of alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal drinking age or under
the influence of alcohol ... or liability imposed by [a]ny statute ...
relating to the sale ... of alcoholic beverages." 9 3 The court of appeals

186. The claimant involved in the collision was driving a rental vehicle at the time of
the collision and carried no insurance. Id. at 827, 440 S.E.2d at 683.
187. Id. at 828,440 S.E.2d at 684 (citing Empire Fire Co. v. Dobbins, 205 Ga. App. 700,
423 S.E.2d 396 (1992); Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Browner, 209 Ga. App. 544, 433
S.E.2d 401 (1993)). The authorities for this conclusion do not completely elucidate its
rationale. Presumably, the court reasoned the garbage truck driver knew his personal
policy would not cover an official vehicle and the claimant was lucky the city carried any
general liability insurance at all. Besides, he might have provided alternative insurance
coverage of his own.
188. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. J.B. Browner, 209 Ga. App. 544, 433 S.E.2d 401
(1993) (the unnamed driver exclusion was supported by consideration in the form of a
reduced premium).
189. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 211 Ga. App. 613, 440 S.E.2d 242 (1994).
190. 211 Ga. App. at 614-15,440 S.E.2d at 244; 209 Ga. App. at 546, 433 S.E.2d at 403.
191. Some of the cases dealing with exclusions are subsumed under other headings in
this Survey.
192. 209 Ga. App. 165, 433 S.E.2d 66 (1993).
193. Id. at 166, 433 S.E.2d at 67 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added). See Schroeder
v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 302, 439 S.E.2d 18 (1993) (business
use exclusion voided coverage although there was no causal connection between loss and
type of excluded activity conducted on the premises).
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held this so-called liquor exclusion was neither ambiguous nor violative
of public policy, because the General Assembly's imposition of tort
liability in connection with certain activities did
not equate to a mandate
14
that these activities be covered by insurance.'
Finally, in Martin v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co., 95 the
court of appeals upheld a'"rental" exclusion in a homeowners' policy
against the contention that it was ambiguous.'
The policy excluded
coverage for "'injury or ... damage ... arising out of the rental or

holding for rental of any part of any premises.'"" 7 It then added that
"'[tIhis exclusion does not apply to ... the rental ... of an insured
location ... in part for use only as a residence, unless a single family
unit is intended for use by the occupying family to lodge more than two
roomers or boarders.'" 9 ' The court of appeals translated this language
to mean that the "policy clearly excludes coverage when the insured
location is rented to others... unless only part of the premises is rented
to no more than two roomers or boarders."'
Since the entire residence was rented out to a whole family, the policy provided no coverage.
This decision is undoubtedly correct, yet one marvels at the infelicity of
draftsmanship which created first a general exclusion, then an exclusion
from the exclusion, and finally an exclusion from the exclusion's
exclusion. Surely such language, although not unambiguous after
syntactical parsing, must complete the rout of any insurance consumer
who subjects the policy to casual perusal. Perhaps the newspeak of our
new easy reading policies has something to commend it after all!
XI. EXTENDED COVERAGE OR OMNIBUS CLAUSES
In TransportationInsurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2oo a data
processing company permitted its employee to use one of the company
owned automobiles for business and personal purposes. The employee
"allowed a visiting friend... to drive the subject vehicle on an errand
to the grocery store for their mutual benefit."
The friend became
involved in a collision and was sued for damages. The employer's

194. 209 Ga. App. at 166, 433 S.E.2d at 67 (citing Hartford Ins. Co. of the Southeast
v. Franklin, 206 Ga. App. 193, 424 S.E.2d 803 (1992)). See also Pock, Insurance, 45
MERCER L. REv.253, 261 (1993).
195. 210 Ga. App. 32, 435 S.E.2d 258 (1993).

196. Id. at 32-33, 435 S.E.2d at 259.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 32,435 S.E.2d at 259 (quoting the policy).
Id. (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
208 Ga. App. 837, 432 S.E.2d 259 (1993).
Id. at 837, 432 S.E.2d at 260 (emphasis added).
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liability policy covered the employer and "[a]nyone else while using with
your permission a covered 'auto' you own, hire or borrow."'° Did this
include the permittee's permittee? The court of appeals held it did.2 "8
The scope of permission dealt with the use to which the vehicle was put
Since the fateful
and not with the identity of the particular driver.'
trip at least partially served the employee's own purpose, it qualified as
a permitted use that brought the operator of the vehicle within the
sweep of the coverage.' 8 The court of appeals distinguished DeWorken
v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.'" In DeWorken the court of
appeals held the permittee's permittee was not covered because the
policy required the operation and use of the vehicle to be with the
permission of the named insured. 7
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wood2' 8 also involved the application of the
popularly named "second permittee doctrine." The owner of a Geo
Tracker frequently allowed her friend to use the vehicle for "driving
around Dublin and socializing with her friends," but did not specifically
permit consumption of alcohol in the vehicle or permit others to drive
it.209 On one occasion, the permittee allowed one of her passengers to
take the wheel. The passenger-operator became involved in a collision
which injured a third passenger. The permittee "had gotten out of the
vehicle just before the collision but did not revoke ...permission to
drive the vehicle."2 10 The court of appeals held the second permittee
was covered because the policy required only that the use rather than
the specific operation of the vehicle be permitted.2 1' The court of
appeals stated:
[Wihere a third person utilizes a vehicle via another person who did
have permission from the owner, the fact that such third person had
neither express or [sic] implied permission from the owner is irrelevant. So is the fact (that) the third person had
no license to drive or
2 12
was expressly forbidden to drive by the owner.

202. Id. at 839, 432 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting the policy).
203. Id. at 840, 432 S.E.2d at 262.
204. Id. at 839,432 S.E.2d at 262 (citing Hemphill v. Home Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 458,
174 S.E.2d 251 (1970)).
205. Id., 432 S.E.2d at 261.
206. 151 Ga. App. 248, 259 S.E.2d 490 (1979).
207. 208 Ga. App. at 839, 432 S.E.2d at 262.
208. 211 Ga. App. 662, 440 S.E.2d 78 (1994).
209. Id.at 662, 440 S.E.2d at 80.
210. Id. at 663, 440 S.E.2d at 80.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins; Co., 190 Ga. App.
593, 594, 379 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1989)).
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Omnibus clauses have undergone an evolution in recent decades. The
1955 Standard Automobile Policy covers any person while using the
automobile, provided that the actual use "is with the permission of the
named insured."2 1 ' The 1963 Family Combination Automobile Policy
is more convoluted, if not recondite. It "covers any other person using
such automobile with... permission... provided his actual operation
or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is with ...
permission, or reasonably believed to be with... permission ... and is
within the scope of such permission. 2 14 The 1985 new wave "easy
reading" Personal Auto Policy covers "[any person using 'your covered
auto,'"

but excludes "any person ...

[ulsing a vehicle without a

"
reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. 211
To this standard language, insurers have often added their own
embroidery. Therefore, it is difficult to give generally valid answers to
questions regarding second permittees or deviations from the scope of
permission. Omnibus clauses will continue to engage courts because of
their ongoing linguistic and structural permutations.21 7

XII. HOMEOWNERS' INSURANCE
The facts in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kephart2 1 have a certain soap opera quality about them. They can be
stated in the form of a simple law school examination: H and W bought
a home that they titled and insured in both their names. Marital
difficulties caused W to move out and live with her mother in a trailer.
H, who had moved out previously, moved back into the home with his
girlfriend "to await the birth of their child."219 Prior to her move, W
removed H's name from the homeowner's policy in partial execution of
an otherwise unconsummated informal agreement that H would
eventually write over his interest in the home to her. W subsequently
obtained a divorce from H. The separation agreement incorporated in
the final decree abrogated the informal prior agreement by providing

213. JUNE M. AUSTIN &NORMAN E. RISJORD, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES
19 (1964).
214. KEEON, supra note 101, at 662 app. H.
215. KIT, 'supranote 187, at 3 Part A.
216. Id. at 4 Part A.
217. Structural changes occur when language relating to permission is hived from the
inclusive coverage clause and placed into a restrictive exclusion. See KEETON & WIDISS,
supra note 70, at § 4.7(bX2). This may impact upon its sweep because coverages are to be
broadly construed and exclusions are to be narrowly construed against the insurer. Id.
218. 211 Ga. App. 423, 439 S.E.2d 682 (1993).
219. Id. at 424, 439 S.E.2d at 683.
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that H was to 'keep the marital abode.' One month after entry of the
final decree, the home was destroyed by fire.22 What are W's rights
under her homeowners' policy?
The answer is that she has no rights.221 Although W was obviously
the only named insured, and arguably had an insurable interest pending
her performance of the separation agreement, her move into the trailer
prior to the fire terminated, or at least suspended, her coverage.22 2
The easy reading policy insured residence premises, defined as "'the one
family dwelling ... where you reside"' and further provided that
"'the residence premises [must be] the only premises where the named
insured... maintains a residence other than business or farm properties."' 4 Such coverage limitations, although variously but plainly
worded, are not uncommon in homeowners' policies. They leave the
court no choice but to deny coverage. This result, "although harsh, [is
the] result contracted for by the parties."22 5
What is the status of an innocent insured after a coinsured has
violated a policy condition which purports to void the policy? The
answer depends on whether the obligations of the insureds under the
policy are joint or several. If they are joint, the misdeeds of one insured
dooms all the others. If they are several, the misdeeds of one insured
has no effect upon the others.
The supreme court, interpreting the 1943 Standard Fire Insurance
Policy in Richards v. Hanover Insurance Co.,226 which excluded losses
caused by the neglect of "the" insured, held the article "the" was
ambiguous.227 As a consequence, the article called for application of
contra proferentem, and was construed in favor of the insured and
against the insurer, which drafted the language.2' The obligation was
thus found to be several.229

220.
221.

Id. at 425, 439 S.E.2d at 683.
Id. at 426, 439 S.E.2d at 684.

222. Id. at 425, 439 S.E.2d at 684.
223. Id, at 424, 439 S.E.2d at 683 (quoting the policy).
224. Id. (quoting the policy).
225. Id. at 425, 439 S.E.2d at 684. In his concurring opinion, Presiding Judge Beasley
stated there was no common law or statutory mandate that insurers expressly warn their
insureds that coverage hinged upon the continued existence of specified conditions or direct
them to notify their insurers of any changes in such conditions. 211 Ga. App. 426-27, 439
S.E.2d at 685 (Beasley, J., concurring).
226. 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561 (1983).
227. Id. at 615-16, 299 S.E.2d at 564.

228. Id.
229. Id.
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In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dean," a case of first impression, the court of appeals interpreted a policy condition declaring that
"'[tihe entire policy will be void if... an insured has. . . intentionally
concealed... any material fact. '
The court of appeals concluded that the indefinite article "an,"clearly
and unambiguously referred to "any" insured and not just to "the"
particular actor. 2 This created a joint obligation by all insureds.'
Misconduct by one could void the policy for all." 4 This, however, did
not end the matter. The innocent insured contended the policy language
was in derogation of Georgia's mandate that fire policies contain
"'language at least as favorable to the insured as the applicable portions
of the standard fire policy."'
This meant the policy had to be
reformed to change the status of coinsureds from joint obligors to several
obligors, consonant with the construction of the supreme court in
Richards."e The court was persuaded and reformed the policy. 7
The case illustrates what is occasionally forgotten: that lawyers have to
go beyond the four corners of the policy in order to construe it and
determine its validity. The Insurance Code or the Commissioner's
Regulations under appropriate delegations, may impart contract terms
which cannot be identified by the methods of interpretation and
construction applied to garden variety contracts, which give free play to
party autonomy.
XIII. LEGISLATION
The 142nd Georgia General Assembly generated no pyrotechnics or
seismic events comparable with the 1991 repeal of Georgia's No-Fault
Statute.S Seventy bills and resolutions relating directly or peripherally to insurance law were introduced. Eighteen bills were signed by the
governor and became law.' 9 If there is any discernible legislative
trend characterizing the last decade, it is that accident and health

230. 212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
231. Id. at 264, 441 S.E.2d at 437-38 (emphasis added).
232. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 438.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing Sales v. State Farm Fire Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1988)).
235. Id. at 264, 441 S.E.2d at 437-38 (quoting O.C.GAk § 33-32-1(a) (1990) and relevant
portions of the 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy).
236. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 438.
237. Id.
238. DawkinsiTaylor Bill, 1991 Ga. Laws 1608.
239. The others never left their committees or were only passed by one house. Because
many of them are topical and quite in keeping with national trends, they may yet resurface
in the near future.
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insurance, once the step-child of regulation like title insurance, are
becoming interstitially the most regulated branches of insurance law.
Although all passed bills bespeak an orderly evolution of Georgia
insurance law and are therefore important, they are generally so
narrowly technical as to engage only the attention of the specialist.' 0
Only three pieces of legislation promise to be of some interest to the
general practitioner.
The first requires all individual and group or blanket accident and
sickness policies issued on or after July 1, 1994, to extend coverage for
diagnostic and surgical procedures in connection with certain dysfunctions of the musculoskeletal structure and the correction of specified
The second introduces a procedure for
functional deformities.2"
cancellation of insurance policies by insureds. 2' This is accomplished
by returning the original policy to the insurer or by submitting a request
to the insurer or its authorized agent "stating a future date on which the
policy is to be cancelled."24 Cancellation is effected on the date of
receipt of the policy, or the request for cancellation, or the future date
specified in the request, whichever is later. The insurer may "waive the
future date requirement by confirming the date and time of cancellation
Whenever a "statute, regulation, or
in writing to the insured."'
without
notifying specified third parties,
contract" prohibits cancellation
cancellation
by mailing or delivering the
only
accomplish
the insurer can
notice to such third parties, and then allowing at least ten days after
mailing or delivery for cancellation to become effective. 2' The third
piece of new legislation is a comprehensive amendment 2' of Georgia's
domestic relations 2" and insurance law2 " designed to comply with
the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")24" to
assure that children have access to accident and health insurance
coverage.

240.

E.g., 1994 Ga. Laws 781 (revising procedures for the conversion of mutual insurers

to stock insurers).
241. 1994 Ga. Laws 871 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-29-20 (1990 & Supp. 1994)).
242. 1994 Ga. Laws 805 (striking O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44.1(a) (1990) and replacing it with
a new subsection § 33-24-44.1(a)).
243. 1994 Ga. Laws 805 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44.1(a)(1)).
244. 1994 Ga. Laws 805.
245. Id. (codified at AO§ 33-24-44.1(b)).
246. 1994 Ga. Laws 1226.
247. O.C.GA. § 19-6-15 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
248. Id. § 33-24-55 (Supp. 1994).
249. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (Sept. 1974).
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LIABILITY INSURER'S OBLIGATION TO DEFEND

Liability insurers are required to defend their insureds against
lawsuits alleging covered claims whether or not the suits are "groundless, false, or fraudulent."20 This obligation is independent of and
potentially larger than the obligation to pay for their insureds' actual
liability and it constitutes the only pervasive form of "legicare" we
have."l The duty is typically, although not exclusively, triggered by
the allegations in the complaint. 2 2 Insurers may face difficult choices
at the threshold of litigation, which may only be eased by assuming the
defense of their insureds under binding reservation of rights, or by
seeking declaratory judgments delineating their obligation, or both.
Insurers making a wrong judgment call may face dire consequences. In
Georgia, insurers may be liable for the entire judgment, including a
default judgment against its insured even though such judgment may be
in excess of the liability limits. The extent of their liability is basically
a question for the jury.'
In Crook v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,' the
insurer was obligated to defend a homeowner against suits to recover
damages for personal injury "caused by an occurrence" which was
somewhat circuitously defined as "an accident."'
"Accident" was not
defined in the policy. After their son was killed in the insured's home,
the parents brought a tort suit for wrongful death against the insured
homeowner. Was the insurer required to extend a defense, even though
evidence indicated that the insured "was a mere bystander while the...
son committed acts which resulted in his own death?" 6 The court of
appeals held the insurer was required to extend a defense. 257 Absent
a definition of accident in the policy, the court of appeals resorted to the
statutory definition of "accident", which the legislature defined as "an
event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation or

250. KEETON, supra note 101, at 662 app. H (the 1963 revision of the Family
Combination Automobile policy).
251. Prepaid general legal insurance plans are virtually unknown. They occasionally
surface in collective bargaining agreements. They pose an actuarial nightmare. See
generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 70, at § 9.1(a).
252. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. McKemie, 244 Ga. 84, 259 S.E.2d 39 (1979), rev'
McKemie v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 149 Ga.App. 19, 253 S.E.2d 399 (1979).
253. Leader Natl Ins. Co. v. Kemp & Son, 259 Ga. 329, 380 S.E.2d 458 (1989).
254. 207 Ga. App. 614, 428 S.E.2d 802 (1993).
255. Id. at 614, 428 S.E.2d at 803 (quoting the policy).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 615, 428 S.E.2d at 803.
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design."'
It was clear from the undisputed evidence in the record
that "death occurred entirely without [the insured's] intentional
'foresight or expectation or design."' 9 Although the subsequent trial
might well reveal the parents' tort allegations as "groundless," the
insurer must abide by the contract to mount a defense on the insured's
behalf.2" The fact that a formally covered tort claim may be factually
unfounded cannot negate the duty t defend. 1
Dynamic Cleaning Service, Inc. v. First Financial Insurance Co.,2
a case of first impression, in some ways represents an exact reversal of
the circumstances surrounding Crook. The insured under a comprehensive general liability policy ("CGL"), was contractually required "to
provide after hours cleaning services to a Dairy Queen restaurant."'
The insured assigned Kemp to do the actual cleaning. When Kemp
allowed a former employee of Dairy Queen to enter the restaurant, the
employee attacked the restaurant's manager "by stabbing him repeatedly.' 4 The manager filed a tort suit against Kemp and the insured.
The suit alleged Kemp was negligent in allowing an unauthorized person
to enter the restaurant after hours and that the insured was vicariously
liable. The CGL policy excluded all coverage "for any claim, demand or
suit based on assault and battery, and assault and battery shall not be
deemed an accident, whether or not committed by or at the direction of
the insured.""5 The court of appeals held that the insurer had no
obligation to defend against the artfully crafted allegations in the
complaint. 2
Although the facts might have ultimately established
direct and vicarious liability for negligence, the allegations clearly
established such negligence gave rise to the very
claim (damage based
26 7
on assault and battery) excluded by the policy.

258. Id. at 614, 428 S.E.2d at 803 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 1-3-3(2) (1982 & Supp. 1994)).
259. Id.

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 208 Ga. App. 37, 430 S.E.2d 33 (1993).
263. Id. at 37-38, 430 S.E.2d at 34.
264. Id. at 38, 430 S.E.2d at 34.
265. Id. (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 39, 430 S.E.2d at 35.
267. Id. See Brayman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 212 Ga. App. 96, 441 S.E.2d 285 (1994)
(holding that a policy covering bodily injury clearly did not cover slander). The court also
imposed a $500 penalty for pursuing a frivolous appeal since appellants had no reasonable
basis for anticipating a reversal of the trial court's decision. Id. at 97, 441 S.E.2d at 286.
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LIMITATION IN POLICY-TIME FOR SUIT

First party policies invariably contain a "private" statute of limitations. With slight variations in the language employed, they mandate
that suits under the policies be brought within one year after "inception
of the loss," or the "loss," or the "occurrence." Since this limitation,
which is typically phrased as an express condition, is for the benefit of
the insurer, it can be waived by the insurer. To determine whether such
waiver has occurred, courts must dissect and evaluate the insurer's
conduct preceding and following the expiration of the one year period.
In Shelter America Corp. v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co.,' the insured mortgagee of a mobile home, which had been
destroyed by fire on December 24, 1988, did not file suit until October
17, 1990, nearly two years after the loss. The insured contacted the
insurer eleven days after the loss and "was informed that ... investigation could take up to several months to complete." 269 Approximately
nine months after the insured completed the proof of loss form provided
by the insurer, settlement negotiations began. Several communications
revealed disagreements in regard to the amount of the loss. About two
weeks before expiration of the one-year period, the insurer sent a letter
which "set forth the method by which it had calculated the value of the
mobile home 270 and stated that "nothing in this letter is intended as
a waiver of any right ...

to insist upon strict compliance with all

contractual terms and conditions, including any applicable limitations."217 All prior communications contained identical disclaimers.
Two weeks after expiration of the one-year period, the insurer finally
informed the insured that its claim was time-barred. 2
The court of appeals sided with the insurer.2 73 There was nothing
in the communications "designed to lull the claimant into a false sense
of security so as to constitute estoppel by conduct. 274 The insured was
alerted to the fact (at all times) that its proper recourse in case of
disagreements was a timely' suit."5 The court of appeals also dismissed the novel argument' that the contractual limitation was tolled

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
(1985)).
275.

209 Ga. App. 258, 433 S.E.2d 140 (1993).
Id. at 258, 433 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. at 259, 433 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. (quoting the letter at issue).
Id.
Id., 433 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. (quoting Desai v. Safeco Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 815, 818, 328 S.E.2d 376, 378
Id.
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until settlement negotiations actually beganY
Even in the best of
circumstances, the tolling may occur only during such negotiations, and
then only if they are attended by the waiver conduct which creates an
estoppel against the insurer. 77 This was obviously not the case in
Shelter. The court also dismissed the contention that the insured's
contractual rights to "demand an appraisal of the losse'Ts in case of
disagreement somehow survived the one year limitation." 9 Even if the
insurer had made a timely demand for such appraisal, "the object of
[such] appraisal would be to determine the amount of loss, and... any
suit to collect any appraised amount would be barred by the same
contractual limitation provision.' °
XVI.

Loss PAYABLE ENDORSEMENT

s was a case of first
Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."
impression in Georgia. Burglars relieved a store owner of merchandise located
on the premises. Acquisition of the merchandise by the store owner was
floor plan financed by a lender, which, at the time of the burglary, had
a security interest in the merchandise covering the owner's indebtedness.
A business policy designated the owner as named insured and the lender
as loss payee "as interest may appear."282
The lender subsequently sued the owner as a creditor "pursuant to the
terms of its floor plan security agreement ...to obtain compensation as
to certain inventory missing and not paid for by" the owner.'
The
suit was settled and the lender signed an omnibus release discharging
the owner from all manner of liability. Did this release authorize the
owner to recover the entire cash value of the stolen merchandise (from
its insurer)? The court of appeals held it did not.2'
The settlement and release focused on the owner's liabilities and not
upon those of the insurer, whose obligation towards the lender loss payee
became fixed the moment the casualty occurred. 2 ' It could not be
tortured into a relinquishment of the lender's security interest in the
stolen property, or into an assignment of its interest as a loss payee.

276. Id. at 260, 433 S.E.2d at 142.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 259, 433 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting the policy).

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id. at 260, 433 S.E.2d 142 (quoting the policy).
208 Ga. App. 166, 430 S.E.2d 75 (1993).
Id. at 170, 430 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting the policy).
Id. at 166, 430 S.E.2d at 76.
Id. at 170, 430 S.E.2d at 79.
Id. at 171, 430 S.E.2d at 79.
Id.
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This was buttressed by the fact that the policy provided that assignments of interests under it would not be binding upon the insurer unless
its consent was "endorsed on the policy."s 7 No endorsement was ever
obtained. Absent an effective assignment, the owner was limited to a
recovery of the jury-determined actual cash value of the stolen property,
as reduced by the value of the lender's insurable interest in the
property.'
Allowing the owner to recover for his own interest and
that of the lender, would violate Georgia's policy "prohibiting windfall
and double recovery. 9
XVII.

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES

In Boynton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' an
insured brought "a putative class action" 1 against an insurer, in
which he urged upon the court a truly novel argument. The insured
contended the use of the word "mutual" in the insurer's name and in its
advertising, coupled with the charging of a membership fee and a
statement in promotional materials that it "will pass along to policyholders any savings resulting from efficient operations," 2 created a
contractual duty to return all income in excess of amounts required for
payment of insurance claims and operating expenses. 2 The court of
appeals had no difficulty in skewering this ingenious argument.2 The
policies themselves stated that policyholders were only entitled "to
receive dividends the Board of Directors in its discretion may declare'
and/or 'to share in the earnings and savings of the company in accordance with the dividends declared by the Board of Directors.'29 5 This
negated any claim based on breach of contract, conversion, fraud, or
injunctive relief under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.2
XVIII.

OTHER INSURANCE-PRIMARY AND EXCESS CARRIERS

When A drives B's car, two liability policies may be present upon the
risk. The same may be true when A drives his own car in the business
of B, who may be vicariously liable for A. If each policy contains an

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 170, 430 S.E.2d at 78.
Id. at 171, 430 S.E.2d at 79.
Id.
207 Ga. App. 756, 429 S.E.2d 304 (1993).
Id. at 756, 429 S.E.2d at 305.
Id., 429 S.E.2d at 306.
Id.
Id. at 757, 429 S.E.2d at 306.
Id. (quoting the policy).
Id. at 757, 429 S.E.2d at 306 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-372 to -373 (1994)).
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unadorned "other" insurance clause, the two carriers simply prorate in
accordance with their respective liability limits. This, however, is an
unlikely event because insurers try to elude proration by elaborate and
specific excess and escape clauses that limit their liability or avoid it all
together. Determining which policy is primary and which is excess
seems to depend on which policy is read first.
One way of cutting this Gordian knot, which is not alien to Georgia," is to hold that irreconcilable excess/escape clauses nullify each
other and ignore them. 8 This restores simple proration." Another
approach is to use some mechanical formula for assigningprimary status
to one of the policies.'
In Georgia, discrete but result oriented
reconciliation on a case-by-case basis has produced a state of affairs in
which the policy insuring the vehicle's owner is generally classified as
the primary policy, and the other is treated as excess or entirely
escapes.~'O
As illustrated in Georgia Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rollins, Inc.,"
sometimes reconciliation is not necessary. A termite extermination
company employee was involved in an accident while driving his own
insured car in the scope of his employment. His policy covered him as
the named insured and also covered his employer as the additional
m5 The policy provided
insured in connection with vicarious liability.'
a $15,000 liability limit and obligated the insurer to defend its insureds.
It also cautioned the employer it was only "excess insurance over any
The employer carried a
other valid and collectible insurance.""

297. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Holton, 131 Ga. App. 247, 205 S.E.2d 872
(1974) (early court decision which found that specific excess clauses in watercraft policies
cancel each other out).
298. Id. at 248, 205 S.E.2d at 874.
299. Werley v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 498 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1972).

300. Id. The case represents a virtual A.L.R. Annotation on the various arbitrary
methods employed for selecting the primary carrier. See John P. Kurtock, Jr., Overlapping
Liability Coverage-The 'Other Insurance" Provision, 25 FEDERATION OF INSURANCE
COUNSEL JOURNAL 45-72 (1974). See also Annotation,Apportionment ofLiability Between
Automobile Liability Insurers Where One of the PoliciesHas an "Excess Insurance"Clause
and the Other a "Proportionate'or "Prorata"Clause, 76 A.L.R.2d 502, 505 (1961).
301. Chicago Ins. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 799, 156 S.E.2d 143 (1967);
see also Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Boerste, 195 Ga. App. 665, 394 S.E.2d 566 (1990).
302. 209 Ga. App. 744, 434 S.E.2d 581 (1993).
303. Id. at 745, 434 SE.2d at 583. The omnibus clause typically covers "any other
person or organization not owning or hiring the automobile, but only with respect to his
or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured." 1963 Family Combination
Automobile Policy. Coverage A, Persons Insured (aX3), (b)(3); KEETON; supra note 101, at

662 app. H.
304. 209 Ga. App. at 746, 434 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
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general liability policy covering nonowned vehicles used by employees.
The policy "provided for a 'self-insured retention' amount of $25,000" and
limited liability to amounts in excess of the self-insured retention.30 5
There was no evidence the employer was a formal self-insurer, which
turned the self-insured retention clause into a simple deductible.3 6
The policy also required the employer to provide its own defense at its
own expense. 0 7 When the employee's carrier refused to extend a
defense to the employer as additional insured, the employer hired its
own attorney who worked with the employer's insurer in conducting the
defense. After the tort suit against the employee and his employer was
settled, the employer sued the employee's insurer "to recover attorney
fees and expenses in the liability suit, and also to recover damages for
the alleged bad faith refusal to defend."3° The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the employer.3°' The court of appeals
sustained the trial court's judgment because it was pellucidly clear that
the language of the two policies meshed and required no reconciliation. 10 The employee's $15,000 policy provided primary coverage. 31 '
It could not masquerade as excess coverage because the employer's policy
provided no "valid and collectible" insurance until the $25,000 threshold
was reached.31

XIX.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE POLICIES

Although generalizations are risky, it is fairly safe to state that
malpractice liability policies appear in two basic iterations.
The
"occurrence"policy requires the liability causing event to occur during
the policy term, even though the actual claim is not made until after the
expiration of the term. The "claims-made"or "discovery"policy requires
the liability causing event to be discovered and result in a claim filed
during the policy term, even though it arose before the term. The
occurrence policy is prospective. It carries a long tail and confronts the
insurer with an actuarial nightmare. Given the lengthening of statutes
of limitations applicable to medical malpractice, the increase in judge

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 745, 434 S.E.2d at 583.

309. Id.
310. Id. at 747, 434 S.E.2d at 584.

311. Id.
312. Id. The court also held that coverage may be forfeited when the insured delays
the forwarding of suit papers if the insurer can show that it was thereby prejudiced. Id.
at 748, 434 S.E.2d at 583.
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made tolling events, and unpredictable inflationary trends, the potential
exposure to liability may bear no rational relationship to the premiums
collected. The discovery policy is retroactive, allowing premiums to be
set in line with past experience. Therefore, it is no surprise that the
discovery policy has become popular with insurers and has partially
supplanted the "occurrence"policy.
Both types of policies surfaced in Brown v. Hitch"'3 in an unusual
and collateral litigation context. A professional corporation supplying
physicians to hospital emergency rooms entered into an employment
contract with the plaintiff. The contract provided the physician "'shall
purchase a professional liability insurance policy ... and insure that
said policy shall be in effect at all times during the terms of the
Agreement.' 14 The contract required the employer to reimburse the
plaintiff for the cost of the premiums paid, but it did not specify the
particular type of policy to be purchased. The physician obtained a
discovery policy, which furnished coverage until he left his employment
after about three years. He was reimbursed for premiums paid during
this time. 15 In anticipation of terminating the employment contract,
the plaintiff purchased a separate tail end or occurrence policy to cover
future claims arising from liability creating events, which might have
occurred during his employment."1 8 The policy became effective upon
termination of his employment, the same time coverage under the
original policy
ceased. The employer refused to reimburse the cost of the
317
new policy.

Was the employer in breach of contract? The court of appeals held he
was not.3"' Both parties understood the insurance requirement of the
contract was imposed because hospital staff rules mandated individual
emergency services physicians carry their own malpractice insurance."1 9 Therefore, the employer was only interested in and willing to
pay for such insurance as the plaintiff carried while providing services
to the hospital.'2 0 This common understanding was further corroborated by the plaintiff's subsequent election to purchase a discovery
policy. 2' Presumably, the plaintiff would have had a valid reimburse-

208 Ga. App. 784, 431 S.E.2d 751 (1993). See generally JERRY, supra note 71, at

313.

§ 62A(e).
314.
315.

208 Ga. App. at 784, 431 S.E.2d at 751 (quoting the employment contract).
Id. at 785, 431 S.E.2d at 751-52.

316. Id., 431 S.E.2d at 752.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id. at 786, 431 S.E.2d at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ment claim if he had procured an occurrence policy at the outset. This
would have met the contract's requirement for a policy effective during
the term of employment and would have covered him prospectively. As
an uninformed insurance consumer, he should not be faulted for his
understandable lack of information, which may be shared by even
experienced attorneys who seek protection from liability for malpractice.s"
XX. RESTITUTION
Does an insurer, that has made a payment to a health care provider
on the mistaken factual assumption that the patient was covered, have
a claim for restitution against the health care provider?"2 3 The answer
is a lawyer-like "yes and no." In 7me Insurance Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb
Hospital Authority, 24 a group health insurer paid Grady Hospital
nearly $200,000 on behalf of a patient for medical treatment actually
rendered. The insurer subsequently discovered that the patient had
been convicted of setting the fire which caused his injury. The patient's
injury arose from the commission of a felony and was therefore
specifically excluded from coverage. Since the payment was made under
an innocent mistake of fact, the insurer contended Grady would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the money.s25 After surveying
Georgia and "instructive" out-of-state cases, the court of appeals
concluded the record revealed no circumstances indicating unjust
enrichment.3 2 The court held, "[it is clear that Grady would be
prejudiced by refunding the payment and that it in good conscience may
retain payment for medical services rendered."327 The result would be

322. In Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co. and Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., the attorneys insured
under legal malpractice policies won their cases after protracted litigation which might

have been averted by a more discriminate and informed selection of the policies at issue.
10 Cal. 3d 216, 514 P.2d 1219 (1973); 100 N.J. 325, 495 A.2d 406 (1985).
323. The case did not involve any rights the insurer might have against the patient by
bestowing a benefit upon him in misreliance upon a unilateral mistake. The law of
restitution was literally hand-crafted by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan (Macpherlan), K.B. 1760, W. BL. 219, 96 Eng. Rep. 120 (KB. 1760). Burr 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676

(KB. 1760).
Although it is based on equitable principles (ex aequo et bono), it can be enforced by
actions at law seeking purely monetary relief (indebitatusassumpsit) or by bills in equity
seeking traditional equitable relief, such as specific restitution or cancellation to prevent
unjust enrichment.
324. 211 Ga. App. 34, 438 S.E.2d 149 (1993).

325. Id. at 36, 438 S.E.2d at 152.
326. Id. at 37, 438 S.E.2d at 152.
327. Id. at 36, 438 S.E.2d at 151 (emphasis added). See generally DAN B. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES

§

11.9 (1973).
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different if Grady had been alerted to the mistake before or at the time
payment was made.3 '5 This lapidary statement, even when viewed
against the discrete authority relied upon, is hardly self-elucidating.
The court did not explain how refunding the money would be prejudicial
to the recipient.
Does it make any difference whether the money received is still
available, or whether it has already been expended? Does it make any
difference whether the services would have been furnished at any rate,
or whether Grady would not have furnished the services but for the
payment (detrimental reliance)? Are either or both of the above
circumstances simply presumed as a matter of common sense? The
precise answer may have to await further fine tuning.
XX.

STATUTORY PENALTIES AND ATORNEY FEES

Georgia law provides:
[iun the event of a loss which is covered by a policy of insurance and
the refusal of the insurer to pay the same within 60 days after a
demand has been made by the holder of the policy and a finding has
been made that such refusal was in bad faith, the insurer shall be
liable to pay such holder, in addition to the loss, not more than 25
percent of the liability of the insurer for the loss and all reasonable
attorney'sfees for the prosecution of the action against the insurer." '"

This requires not only a finding that the plaintiff has "won" the case, but
also a separate finding that the insurer was in bad faith in not
defending the claim. 3 '
Speaking from general experience acquired in writing this survey for
over a quarter of a century and without the aid ofjurimetric inquiry, the
author may accurately conclude that insureds are rarely vindicated
when they assert claims for attorney fees and bad faith penalties."3
The reasons are pluriform. Insureds may simply lose because they have
no underlying claim," or because they are unable to establish the
insurers' procrastinations or denials were in bad faith or stubbornly

328. 211 Ga. App. at 36, 438 S.E.2d at 151-52.
329. O.C.G.A. § 334-6 (1992) (emphasis added). See generally 22A

JEAN APPLEMAN,

INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTicE § 14532 (1979); JERRY supra note 71, at § 99(b).

330. In regard to uninsured coverage, almost identical language is found in O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11(j) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
331. E.g., Southern Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Northwest Ga. Bank, 209 Ga. App. 867,
434 S.E.2d 729 (1993).
332. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., Inc. v. Riedl, 209 Ga. App. 883, 434 S.E.2d 820
(1993); Schroeder v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 302,439 S.E.2d 18
(1993).
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litigious and contumacious. 3 Yet, one cannot conclude from the high
casualty rate amongst prayers for bad faith penalties the statute has
failed its intended purpose. Any such conclusion would ignore the
ineluctable fact that many attorneys tend to add prayers for such relief
almost as a matter of routine.'
From the vantage point of the
insurer, the "best' case for fending off such claims is a showing that the
particular issue involved had never been decided in this state.' A
showing that there is a persistent conflict in the evidence, or that there
is an arguable cleavage of authority in Georgia precedents, is of nearly
equal utility." One could, of course, penalize all insurers for making
wrong judgment calls in good faith. Yet even the most avid consumer
advocates do not demand that insurers defend all cases at their own
peril. Such policy would, aside from its doubtful constitutionality,
simply push our premiums into the stratosphere.
Perhaps the time has come to rethink our traditional litigation cost
allocation rule, which requires winning plaintiffs to defray the expense
of their legal representation. In addition to rules penalizing the
insurer's conduct, the law might simply provide that losing insurers who
make wrong judgment calls in denying or defending claims are liable for
the winning plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees. This would be
particularly useful in connection with certain claims, such as relatively
small tort claims or general contract claims, in which contingent fee
contracts are uncommon. If one concedes that both parties are entirely
innocent, it is nevertheless the insurer that set into motion events
(denial of claims and thus necessitating litigation) which have caused
the loss (the insured's attorney fees). When confronting a situation
where one innocent party caused a loss to another innocent party, the
legal system normally shifts the burden of the loss to the actor.
There is also ample precedent for reallocating attorney fees in this
manner in connection with special litigation governing an increasing
number of legal scenarios. It is also routine practice in administering
equitable remedies. It is already, nolens volens, the law in Georgia in
those areas where federal law preempts local law. Thus, under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), Georgia may not
apply its penalty statute, but may only award attorney fees as provided

333. Neal v. Superior Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 827, 432 S.E.2d 253 (1993) (insurer's
refusal to pay was reasonable as a matter of law).
334. About 15 to 20% of all appellate cases involve claims for statutory penalties and
attorney fees.
335. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dean, 212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
336. Rice v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 208 Ga. App. 166,430 S.E.2d 75 (1993);
Homick v. American Casualty Co., 209 Ga. App. 156, 433 S.E.2d 318 (1993).
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by ERISA itself.'3 Obviously such cataclysmic change would require
initiatives which may never commend themselves to the General
Assembly.
XXII. UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED COVERAGE
Litigation generated by the Georgia Uninsured Motorist Act'
swallowed up more than ten percent of all appellate judge time devoted
This litigation proneness extends beyond
to insurance cases. 9
Georgia and is a well-documented national phenomenon. '4
A.

Phantom Cars and Hit-and-Run Vehicles
The 1963 Family Combination Automobile Policy"i and the standard

1985 Personal Auto Policy,342 for obvious evidentiary purposes, require
physical contact between the insured or the insured's vehicle and the hitand-run vehicle, the operator or owner of which cannot be identified.'
Some states mandate coverage for hit-and-run vehicles without explicitly
imposing a physical contact requirement. Whether the term hit-and-run
standing by itself necessarily denotes physical contact has become a
contentious issue resulting in cleavages of authority.3 " Several courts
have held that hit-and-run requires no physical contact because it "is
merely a shorthand colloquial expression that is designed to describe a
motorist who has caused ... an accident and flees the scene."3 45
Hence, all policies requiring physical contact are considered in derogation of the statutory mandate. Georgia, in a 1983 amendment of the
Uninsured Motorist Act (UMC"), 3 explicitly dispensed with the
physical contact requirement whenever "the descriptionby the claimant
of how the occurrence occurred [sic] is corroboratedby an eyewitness to

337. Cockey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 804 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (construing
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 relating to state laws providing insurance in compliance with

ERISA).
338. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
339. Nine uninsured motorist cases were decided during this survey year. Some are
discussed under other headings in this survey. The stream of litigation varies somewhat

from year to year but never becomes a rivulet.
340. See KETON & WIDISS, supra note 70, at § 4.9(a).
341. KEETON, supra note 101, at 664 app. H.
342. KIT, supra note 187, at 6 PART C.C.3 ("a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or
owner cannot be identified and which his ...
343. Id.

you") (emphasis added).

344. See ALAN I. WIDss, A GUmE TO UNINSURED MOTORxsr COVERAGE § 2.41 (1969 &
Supp. 1980).
345. Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Ins. CosJAm. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 416, 419 (R.I. 1981).
346. O.C.G-A § 33-7-11 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
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the occurrence other than the claimant."' 7 In the typical case arising
under this amendment, the claimant does not want for a description of
the occurrence, but lacks the requisite corroboration."8
In Langford v. Royal Indemnity Co., 49 this fact pattern was curiously inverted. The claimant was injured when she ran into a road curbing
in an attempt to evade a collision with a truck which suddenly swerved
into her lane. The truck driver stated to a police officer on the scene
that an unidentified Buick stopped in front of his truck causing him "to
come to an immediate stop, that [his] truck bumped the Buick and, that
in the process of stopping, the truck trailer slid into the [claimant's]
lane. - 5o
When the claimant, who had not personally seen the phantom Buick,
became aware of this new posture of affairs, she amended her complaint
against the trucking company by adding a "John Doe" defendant and
serving her uninsured motorist carrier. 35 ' At this point her pleadings
went awry. After alleging her claim against the trucking company with
reasonable particularity, she vaguely added that the truck driver may
have swerved into [her] lane to avoid a vehicle driven negligently by an
unknown third-party driver as alleged by the [truck] driver in the
accident report."' Was this a "description by the claimant of how the
occurrence occurred" which could be corroborated by direct evidence of
its eyewitness, the truck driver? The court of appeals held it was
not. 3 The claimant's new "averment constituted nothing more than
a speculative allegation of how the occurrence may have occurred."'
This was not cured by the general averment in her prayer for relief that
some unspecified negligence by "John Doe" caused the chain reaction
which resulted in her mishap. 35
Since there was no positive description of the occurrence, there was
nothing to be corroborated, and the court of appeals determined that

347. Id. § 33-7-11(b)(2) (emphasis added).
348. E.g., Scott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 200 Ga, App. 296, 407 S.E.2d 492 (1991); Nat'l
Surety Corp. v. O'Dell, 195 Ga. App. 374, 393 S.E.2d 504 (1990).
349. 208 Ga. App. 128, 430 S.E.2d 98 (1993).
350. Id. at 128, 430 S.E.2d at 101 (emphasis added).
351. Id. at 134, 430 S.E.2d at 101. A claimant must first obtain at least a nominal
judgment against the known uninsured driver or file a "John Doe" action against the
unknown (and hence presumed uninsured) driver before proceeding against the uninsured
motorist carrier. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Noble, 208 Ga. App. 518, 520, 430
S.E.2d 804, 806 (1993).
352. 208 Ga. App. at 133, 430 S.E.2d at 105 (quoting the pleadings).

353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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summary judgment in favor of the UMC was warranted.3 6 The court
of appeals added, parenthetically, that the claimant could not contend
there was any indirect contact with the phantom vehicle because such
contact which may have occurred was only between the phantom vehicle
and the truck, without any further contact between the truck and her
vehicle. 7
The only consolation one can offer the claimant is she would probably
have lost her case under any circumstances, even if she had adopted the
truck driver's statement as her description of the occurrence in the
pleadings. Obviously her own testimony in the subsequent trial would
not have implicated the phantom vehicle which she never saw. In the
absence of other witnesses fleshing out her description of the occurrence,
Surely the court in
she would have faced the same problem." 8
Langford did not suggest that she could base her description solely on
the truckdriver's testimony and then rely upon the same testimony for
its corroboration.159
The contact/corroboration test also bedevils many claimants who have
a great deal of evidence negating any suspicion that their claims may be
feigned. In Fisher v. Clarendon National Insurance Co.,' a case that
could serve as a contemporary cultural pastiche, the driver of a truck
and trailer was suddenly fired upon and hit by occupants of an
unidentified sports car who had been harassing him for some time. The
bullets damaged his cab and caused him severe injury. The driver
managed to stop the rig on the side of the road, dismount, and flag down
a motorist whom he asked to call the police. He then staggered to a
house and told his story to the owner who "called authorities and
attempted to stem the bleeding until they arrived."6 1 The court of
appeals held the driver was not covered by his uninsured motorist
rider.36 2 Res gestae evidence as to his condition immediately after the
accident was not corroboration. Being hit by a bullet fired from a
phantom vehicle was not the same as being hit by the vehicle itself, even

356. Id. at 133-34, 430 S.E.2d at 105.
357. Id. at 130, 430 S.E.2d at 102 (citing State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Guest, 203 Ga.
App. 711, 417 S.E.2d 419 (1992)).
358. Hoffman v. Doe, 191 Ga. App. 319, 381 S.E.2d 546 (1989).
359. See Bell v. Coronet Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 211, 398 S.E.2d 242 (1990). The
claimant's description, based on her own observation, need not be perfect, but it has to

suggest, at the very least, that a phantom vehicle was implicated as a causal factor in the
occurrence. Atlanta Casualty Ins. Co. v. Crews, 197 Ga. App. 48, 397 S.E.2d 466 (1990).
360. 210 Ga. App. 711, 437 S.E.2d 344 (1993).
361. Id. at 712, 437 S.E.2d at 345-46.
362. Id. at 713-14, 437 S.E.2d at 347.
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if one concedes launching projectiles from an uninsured vehicle qualifies
as a use of the vehicle.3s
Finally, in Murphy v. Georgia General Insurance Co.,' plaintiff
contended he needed no eyewitness corroboration of his claim that "a
pipe fell from the bed of [an] unknown truck, struck the windshield of
He was also out of
his vehicle and caused him to lose control ... .3
luck. The court of appeals held that a collision with a phantom vehicle's
cargo was not the same as a collision with the vehicle itself or with one
of its components."
Service Upon the Uninsured Motorist and the UMC
Attorneys who file automobile liability suits on behalf of their clients
must do so within two years of the date of the accident.' 7 They are
also well advised to involve their clients' UMC's at the earliest possible
moment, even in those cases where the alleged tortfeasor appears to
carry sufficient liability coverage to pay for the damage and there is no
doubt about the liability carrier's solvency. The procedure is disarmingly
simple. It is satisfied by serving a copy of the action upon the UMC as
though the UMC were actually named as a party defendant.'" Such
service must be perfected within the time required by law for service
upon the alleged tortfeasor 6 Timely filing coupled with late service,
either upon the tortfeasor, the UMC, or both, may have dire consequences.37 Service after the expiration of the statute of limitations relates
back to the time of filing and tolls the statute of limitations only if the
can prove "'that he acted in a reasonable and diligent manplaintiff
371
ner.'
Whether the plaintiff has done so is largely, committed to the
discretion of the trial judge, whose finding of laches will rarely be
disturbed on appeal. 7 ' In Walker v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
B.

363. Id.
364. 208 Ga. App. 501, 431 S.E.2d 147 (1993).

365. rd. at 502, 431 S.E.2d at 147.
366. Id., 431 S.E.2d at 148 (distinguishing State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Guest, 203 Ga.
App. 711, 417 S.E.2d 419 (1992) which involved an integral tire assembly of an unknown
vehicle),
367. O.C.GA. § 9-3-33 (1982).
368. Id. § 33-7-11(d) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
369. Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582, 224 S.E.2d 416 (1976).
370. The consequences include a possible exposure to a malpractice suit for the
attorney involved.
371. Forsyth v. Brazil, 169 Ga. App. 438, 313 S.E.2d 138 (1984) (quoting Childs v.
Catlin, 134 Ga. App. 778, 781, 216 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1975)).
372.
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Insurance Co.,"' the trial court held the doctrine of laches was applicable when the plaintiff waited until one month before expiration of the
two year limitation to file his action against two alleged tortfeasors and
serve a copy of the action upon his UMC.37 4 "He then waited until 40
days after the statute had expired to file a motion for service by
publication,3 75 claiming he could not find the culprits despite the
efforts of a private detective whom he engaged for that purpose. Service
remained unperfected. The court of appeals upheld the trial judge's
finding of laches and his grant of summary judgment for the UMC. 76 77
In Peoples v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'
plaintiff in an automobile tort action decided to add his UMC as a party.
He filed a motion to this effect with the trial court about two weeks
before the expiration of the statute of limitations. The motion was
denied, and the UMC was not served with the amended complaint until
more than two months after the expiration of the statute. Plaintiff
claimed he had been informed that he could not receive timely hearing
on the motion because the next motion day was not until after expiration
of the statute."' 8 The court of appeals held the decision to name the
UMC as a defendant had nothing to do with the UMC's entitlement to
timely service."" Plaintiff should have served a copy of the original
action upon his UMC.'
On a parity of reasoning with Walker, the
court of appeals again upheld the trial's judge's finding of laches."1
C.

Umbrella Uninsured Coverage
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Thibadeau, 82 the claimant's ingenious attempts to secure underinsured coverage under a homeowners
umbrella and personal excess liability policy, although unsuccessful,
deserve an "A"for effort. The policy stated that uninsured/underinsured
coverage "'is only in effect if your primary Uninsured and Underinsured

373. 207 Ga. App. 874, 429 S.E.2d 289 (1993).
374. Id. at 875, 429 S.E.2d 291.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 876, 429 S.E.2d at 291.
377. 211 Ga. App. 55, 438 S.E.2d 167 (1993).
378. Id. at 55, 438 S.E.2d at 168.
379. Id. at 56, 438 S.E.2d at 169.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 57, 438 S.E.2d at 169. It is interesting to note that laches, once a defense
exclusive to equity (an unexplained delay in asserting one's rights resulting in prejudice
to the defendant) has now seeped into administrative law and actions at law as is shown
by many insurance cases.
382. 210 Ga. App. 479, 436 S.E.2d 515 (1993).
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Motorist limits are shown in the Section 11 Schedule."' s The claimant did have a $50,000 primary uninsured/underinsured coverage under
another policy, but the Section III Schedule in the excess policy indicated
"No Coverage." The claimant contended "No Coverage" was "tantamount
to a specification of a coverage limit of $0, thereby giving rise to underinsured coverage of $1,000,000," the limit of the umbrella policy.' The
claimant also contended that she had a claim under the "Other
Insurance" clause in the umbrella policy, which provided that "'[olur
coverage is excess over any other insurance. This means all insurance
which covers you ... whether it is shown in the Section III Schedule or
not.,-s'
The court of appeals dismissed this fallacy."' There was no ambiguity."7 "No Coverage" meant precisely what it said; uninsured/underinsured coverage would be provided only if primary limits were in fact
indicated in the Section III Schedule.'
Thus, the umbrella provided
no such coverage." 9 The general "Other Insurance" clause "created no
independent right to insurance,""' but merely asseverated any coverage furnished by the umbrella policy under whatever rubric was agreed
to be excess only.39 1 Since the "No Coverage" clause was the more
specific provision, it would prevail over the more general "Other
Insurance" clause even if one were to concede there was a conflict
between the two.'
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at 480, 436
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